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the likely result will be for state court judges to move in the direction of
imposing maximum sentences in all cases where appeal is likely.
It is the personal opinion of the writer that in every case the defendant
is entitled to credit for time served. On a second trial, it is permissible
to impose a harsher sentence than imposed at the original trial provided
the court, in imposing such a sentence, states for the record the reasons
for the excess sentence and clearly indicates that the mere exercise of the
right of appeal or of post-conviction relief was not the reason for the
excess sentence.1
JAMES H. Pou BAILEY*
A Survey of Loyalty Oath Tests
Introduction
One of the most significant developments in freedom of political
expression in the period following World War Two has been the estab-
lishment of loyalty qualifications for employment. Major emphasis on
loyalty requirements has been in government employment and defense
plants, but programs have been established and proposed in a wide area
of private employment as well.
One form of loyalty qualification has been the requirement of taking
a loyalty oath or completing a loyalty affidavit as a condition of employ-
ment. By constitutional and statutory requirements, public officials and
employees have customarily been required to take oaths to support the
U.S. and state constitutions and laws. The issue arises as to oaths and
affidavits which go beyond the traditional scope. The significance for
freedom of political expression lies both in the restrictions imposed by the
requirement of taking the oath and in the enforcement of the oath
through perjury or similar proceedings. Another major form of loyalty
qualification has been the requirement that persons meet certain stan-
dards of loyalty as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment.
Justification for oaths and other loyalty requirements comes mainly from
the needs of national security.
The initial and major emphasis on employee loyalty came from the
Federal Government in the period following the establishment of the Coin-
' Certiorari granted on January 13, 1969. Argument before the United States
Supreme Court scheduled during last week in February, 1969.
* Resident Judge of Tenth Judicial District.
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mittee on Un-American Activities in 1938. Before that time no loyalty
program had existed in the Federal Government. There was, in fact, a
requirement in Civil Service Rule I, issued in 1884, that no inquiry could
be made of the political or religious opinions or affiliations of any appli-
cant.' In 1939, Congress passed the Hatch Act2 which made it unlawful
for any person employed by the Federal Government "to have member-
ship in any political party or organization which advocated the overthrow
of our constitutional form of government in the United States."'  In
1941, Congress began to incorporate a provision into almost all appro-
priation acts that none of the funds could be used to pay the salary or
wages of "any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organiza-
tion that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States
by force or violence." These provisions also made it a criminal offense
for any such person to accept employment in the Federal Government.
The Civil Service Commission interpreted the language of the Hatch Act
and the apppropriation riders to exclude from government employment
members of the Communist Party, the German Bund, or any other
Communist, Nazi, or Fascist organization.4
Throughout the war years administration of loyalty measures re-
mained largely uncoordinated and somewhat haphazard. Then in 1947,
President Truman promulgated a program, through executive order,
5
which served as the principal basis for the federal employee loyalty pro-
gram until 1953, when the Eisenhower Administration reviewed and
revised the loyalty program with the purpose of making it more effective.
The new executive order' transformed the program into the loyalty-
security program.
Meanwhile, Congress passed measures to up date the nation's security
programs with the Smith Act in 1940,' the Internal Security Act of
1950,' the Communist Control Act in 1954, and other legislation.
Before World War II, state legislation imposing loyalty qualifications
as a condition of state employment mainly took the form of teachers'
1 Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the
United States (Buffalo, N.Y.: Dennis & Co., Inc., 1958), p. 555.
2 53 Stat. 1147, Aug. 2, 1939, 5 U.S.C. § 118; et seq. (1964).
Ibid.
'Id., p. 556.
'No. 9835, 12 F.R. 1935, March 21, 1947.
No. 10491, 18 F.R. 6583, Oct. 16, 1953.
' 54 Stat. 670, June 28, 1940, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1964).
8 64 Stat. 987, Sept. 23, 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1964).
0 68 Stat. 775, Aug. 24, 1954, 50 U.S.C. § 841 et seq. (1964).
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oath laws. Since the War, however, there has been a rapid development
in state laws requiring loyalty oaths or tests for employees generally.
In 1958, thirty states had such laws; five other states had laws applying
only to teachers, and thirty-two states had loyalty requirements for Civil
Defense Workers. 10
These laws may take the form of test oaths or administrative pro-
grams or a combination of the two. The oaths usually require the employee
to swear that he does not advocate the overthrow of the government by
force or belong to an organization that does. Sometimes they cover past
and often future conduct. Others go farther.
This paper will attempt to trace the rulings of the Supreme Court
on cases concerned with loyalty oaths in an effort to see how the Court
has changed from a willingness to allow some restrictions to be imposed
on individual freedoms to opinions which afford more freedom of
political expression and association.
In American Communications Association v. Douds" in 1950, the Su-
preme Court was asked to decide the question whether, consistently with
the First Amendment, Congress may by statute exert pressures upon
labor unions to deny positions of leadership to certain persons who are
identified by particular beliefs and political affiliations.
Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act,12 commonly referred to as the
non-Communist affidavit provision, provides that no investigation shall
be made by the National Labor Relations Board of any question unless
all officers of the labor organization concerned in the dispute sign
an affidavit that they are not members of the Communist Party and that
they do not believe in, or support any organization that believes in or
teaches the overthrow of the United States government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional methods.
The union challenged Sec. 9(h) as a violation of First Amendment
guarantees and contended that the "clear and present danger" test should
apply.
The Court held that the freedoms of speech, press or assembly, estab-
lished in the First Amendment are dependent on the power of constitu-
tional government to survive. If it is to survive the government must
have the power to protect itself against unlawful conduct. Thus freedom
of speech does not include the unlimited right to speak on any subject
10 Id., p. 655.
"339 U.S. 382 (1950).
1261 Stat. 136, June 23, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 150 (1964).
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at any time. Also, this is not merely a matter of speech, but the Govern-
ment's interest here is not in preventing the dissemination of communist
doctrine or the holding of particular beliefs because it fears that unlawful
action will result thereform if free speech is practiced. Its interest is in
protecting the free flow of commerce from what Congress considers to be
substantial evils of conduct that are not the product of speech at all.
Sec. 9 (h), in other words, does not interfere with speech and free political
expression because Congress fears the consequences of speech; it regu-
lates harmful conduct which Congress has determined is carried on by
persons who may be identified by their political affiliations and beliefs.
Congress may under its constitutional power to regulate commerce
among the several states attempt to prevent political strikes and other
kinds of direct action designed to burden and interrupt the free flow of
commerce.
The union also challenged Sec. 9(h) as being vague and broad and as
being a bill of attainder.
The charge of vagueness is inapplicable because the only punishment
specified is the application of Sec. 35(A) of the Criminal Code1 3 which
covers only those statements made knowingly and willfully; neither is it
a bill of attainder because the law is intended to prevent future action
rather than to punish past action.
The union complained that Sec. 9(h) violated the Constitution because
it is in oath form; they claimed it was comparable to a "religious test."
But the Court said this oath is not in that category. The Constitution
permits the requirement of oaths by office holders to uphold the Constitu-
tion; the Framers thought that the exaction of an affirmation of minimal
loyalty to the Government was worth the price of whatever deprivation
of individual freedom of conscience involved. The casting of Sec. 9(h)
in the mold of an oath does not invalidate it, if it is otherwise Constitu-
tional.
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore4 is a case
in which the decision of the state court was upheld. A decision by the
highest court of Maryland upholding the validity of a Maryland law,
construed as requiring that, in order for a candidate for public office in
that State to obtain a place on the ballot, he must take an oath that he
is not engaged "in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the
" 18 U.S.C. § 35(A) (1964).
"341 U.S. 56 (1951).
4
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government by force or violence," and that he is not knowingly a member
of an organization engaged in such an attempt, was affirmed on the under-
standing that an affidavit in those terms would fully satisfy the require-
ment.
Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles affirms the de-
cision of the state court upholding ordinance requirements for an oath
and an affidavit of loyalty for a person to hold office or employment in
the service of the City of Los Angeles. 15 In 1948, the City passed an
ordinance requiring each of its officers and employees to take an oath
that he has not within the five years preceding the effective date of the
ordinance, does not now, and will not while in the service of the City,
advise, advocate or teach the overthrow by force, violence or other un-
lawful means, of the State or Federal Government or belong to an organi-
zation which does so or has done so within such five-year period. The
ordinance required every employee to execute an affidavit stating whether
or not he is or ever was a member of the Communist Party of the
United States of America or of the Communist Political Association, and
if he is or was such a member, stating the dates when he became, and the
periods during which he was such a member.
Petitioners attack the ordinance as violative of the provision of Art.
I, Sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution that "No State shall ...pass any
Bill of Attainder (or) ex post facto Law. . . ." They also contended
that the ordinance deprived them of freedom of speech and assembly
and of the right to petition for redress of grievances.
The affidavit raises the issue whether the City of Los Angeles is con-
stitutionally forbidden to require that its employees disclose their past or
present membership in the Communist Party or the Communist Political
Association. The Federal Constitution does not forbid a municipality to
require such an affidavit from its employees. The Court reasoned that
a municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency of the
State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove rele-
vant to their fitness and suitability for the public service. Past conduct
may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable rela-
tionship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into
in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry
and are not less relevant in public employment.
The ordinance is not a bill of attainder; no punishment is imposed
15341 U.S. 716 (1951).
5
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by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qualification
and eligibility for public employment. It is not ex post facto, since
the activity covered by the oath had been proscribed by the Charter in
the same terms, for the same purpose, and to the same effect over seven
years before, and two years prior to the period covered by the oath.
The Court assumes here that the oath will not be construed as affecting
adversely persons who during their affiliation with a proscribed organiza-
tion were innocent of its purpose, or those who severed their relations with
any such organization when its character became apparent, or those who
were affiliated with organizations which were not engaged in proscribed
activities at the time of their affiliation; and that, if this interpretation of
the oath is correct, the City will give those petitioners who heretofore
refused to take the oath an opportunity to take it as interpreted and
resume their employment. As thus construed, the requirement of the
oath does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court assumes that scienter is implicit in each clause of the
oath.
In the case of Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York
the Court held in 1952, that the state may set requirements for employees
to meet in order to hold positions, that the state has the right to inquire
of is employees relative to their fitness and suitability for public service. 6
This case also indicated the importance of determining whether a rule
based on association applies to innocent as well as knowing activity. The
Court, in upholding the legislation, expressly noted that the New York
courts had construed the statute to require knowledge of organizational
purpose before Sec. 3022 of the statute concerning membership could
apply.
Wienian v. Updegraff was decided by the Supreme Court in 1952."7
This case was an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa upholding the validity of a loyalty oath' s presribed by Oklahoma
statute for all state officers and employees. Apellants, employed by the
State as members of the faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural
and Mechanical College, failed, within the thirty days permitted, to take
the oath required by the Act. Appellee Updegraff, as a citizen and tax-
payer, thereupon brought this suit in the District Court of Oklahoma
County to enjoin the necessary state officials from paying further com-
1 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
17344 U.S. 183 (1952).
"8 Oklahoma loyalty oath: Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, 51 § 36.2.
6
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pensation to employees who had not subscribed to the oath. The appel-
lants, who were permitted to intervene, attacked the validity of the Act
on the grounds, among others, that it was a bill of attainder; an ex post
facto law; impaired the obligation of their contracts with the State and
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They
also sought a mandatory injunction directing the state officers to pay their
salaries regardless of their failure to take the oath. The court upheld
the Act and enjoined the stated officers from making further salary
payments to the appellants. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed,
and the U.S. Supreme Court took the case on an appeal from that court.
They read the highest state court's decision as limiting the organizations
proscribed by the Act to those designated on the list or lists of the
Attorney General which had been issued prior to the effective date of
the Act. Although this interpretation discarded clear language of the
oath as surplusage, the state court denied the appellants' petition for
rehearing which included a plea that refusal of the court to permit appel-
lants to take the oath as so interpreted was violative of due process.
The State said the purpose of the Act was to make loyalty a qualifica-
tion to hold public office or be employed by the State. During periods
of international stress, the extent of legislation with such objectives
accentuates our traditional concern about the relation of government to
the individual in a free society. The perennial problem of defining that
relationship becomes acute when disloyalty is screened by ideological
patterns and techniques of disguise that make it difficult to identify.
Democratic government is not powerless to meet this threat, but it must
do so without infringing the freedoms that are the ultimate values of all
democratic living. In the adoption of such means as it believes effec-
tive, the legislature is therefore confronted with the problem of balancing
its interest in national security with the often conflicting constitutional
rights of the individual.
With the decision of Garner before it the Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to extend to appellants an opportunity to take the oath. A peti-
tion for rehearing which urged that failure to permit appellants to take
the oath as interpreted deprived them of due process was denied. This is
viewed as a holding that knowledge is not a factor under the Oklahoma
statute. This raises the question whether the Due Process Clause permits
a state, in attempting to bar disloyal individuals from its employ, to ex-
clude persons solely on the basis of organizational membership, regardless
7
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of their knowledge concerning the organizations to which they had be-
longed. Under the Oklahoma Act the fact of association alone determines
disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not whether association existed
innocently or knowlingly. To thus inhibit individual freedom of move-
ment is to stifle the flow of democratic expression and controversy at one
of its chief sources. The Supreme Court held that indiscriminate classi-
fication of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of
arbitrary power, and thus held the oath offends due process.
The Court does not consider whether an abstract right to public em-
ployment exists, but it suffices to say that constitutional protection does
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Dant9 a U.S. Appeals Court
set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board requiring an
employer to cease and desist from unfair labor practices on the ground
that Sec. 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the
Labor Management Relations Act, had not been complied with. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and decided the case in February of
1953. The Court held that Section 9(h) of the Act does not preclude
issuance by the National Labor Relations Board of an unfair-labor
practice complaint under Sec. 10(c) after the required non-Communist
affidavits have been filed, even though they had not been filed when the
union filed the charge with the Board, and the Court of Appeals decision
was therefore dismissed.
Speiser v. Randall"° reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the
Supreme Court of California, and the case was decided in June of
1958. The appellants were denied tax exemptions provided for veterans
by the California Constitution. The exemptions were denied because
the appellants refused to subscribe to oaths that they do not advocate
the overthrow of the Federal or State Government by force, violence
or other unlawful means, or advocate the support of a foreign government
against the United States in event of hostilities. The filing of such an
oath was required by California statute as a prerequisite to qualification
for the tax exemption, in order to effectuate a provision of the Stated
Constitution denying any tax exemption to any person who advocates
such actions. This was construed by the State Supreme Court as denying
1 344 U.S. 375 (1953).
20 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
8
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tax exemptions only to claimants, who engage in speech which may be
criminally punished.
The Court held that enforcement of this provision through procedures
which place the burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayers denied
them freedom of speech without the procedural safeguards required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since free
speech is involved, due process requires in the circumstances of this
case that the State bear the burden of showing that the appellants engaged
in criminal speech.
The rule for this case follows that when a State undertakes to
restrain unlawful advocacy, it must provide procedures which are adequate
to safeguard against infringement of constitutionally protected rights.
Due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State
comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.
Since the entire statutory procedure violated the requirements of
due process by placing the burdens of proof and persuasion on them, the
appellants were not obliged to take even the first step in such procedure as
a condition for obtaining the tax exemption. The decision of the Cali-
fornia court was reversed and the causes remanded.
Shelton v. Tucker"' came to the Supreme Court on an appeal from
an Arkansas Federal District Court. An Arkansas statute required that
every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state-supported school
or college, file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organi-
zation to which he had belonged or regularly contributed within the
preceding five years. Teachers in state-supported schools and colleges
were not covered by a civil service system, they were hired on a year-to-
year basis, and they had no job security beyond the end of each school
year. The contracts of the teachers involved in this case were not renewed
because they refused to file the required affidavits. The Supreme Court
held the statute invalid and reversed the district court decision. The
Supreme Court held that the statute was invalid, because it deprived
teachers of their right of associational freedom protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state
action. The statute inhibited the freedom to associate with impunity.
The Court reasoned there can be no doubt of the right of a State
to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to
teach in its schools, but to compel a teacher to disclose his every associa-
21 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
9
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tional tie is to impair his right of free association, a right closely allied
to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society. The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep
of the statute here involved and its comprehensive interference with
associational freedom go far beyond what might be justified in the exer-
cise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competence of its
teachers.
The rule of this case would state that legitimate legislative goals
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Killian v. United States22 concerns the case in which a union official
was convicted in a Federal District Court of swearing falsely that he was
not a member of, or affiliated with, the Communist Party, in an affidavit
filed with National Labor Relations Board to enable a union of which he
was an officer to comply with Sec. 9(h) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. The case came to the Supreme
Court on certiorari from a U.S. Appeal Court. It was decided in Decem-
ber of 1961.
At the trial, petitioner moved under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 for produc-
tion, for use in cross-examination, of all statements given by two govern-
ment witnesses relating to their testimony. All narrative statements of
both witnesses which related to their direct testimony were produced and
made available to petitioner; but notes made by an F.B.I. agent covering
oral reports of one witness regarding his expenses and receipts signed
by both witnesses for money paid to them for expenses were not produced,
and they were not in the record before Court. In the Supreme Court,
the Solicitor General represented that the notes covering oral reports of
the witness regarding his expenses had been destroyed before the trial,
that most of the receipts for expense money signed by the witnesses did
not relate to anything mentioned in their direct testimony, and that,
although some of the receipts contained information relating to the direct
testimony of one of the witnesses, all such information had been made
available to petitioner in the narrative statements of that witness.
The judgment was vacated and the cause was remanded to the District
Court for a hearing and findings of fact on the issues raised by the
Solicitor General's representations, with instructions for that court to
find if his representations are true in all material respects, if this is found
2 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
10
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol1/iss1/8
58 NORTH CAROLINA COLLEGE LAW JOURNAL
it shall enter a new final judgement based upon the record as supplemented
by its findings, thereby preserving to petitioner an appeal to the Court
of Appeals. If the District Court finds that the Solicitor General's repre-
sentations are untrue in any material respect, it shall grant petitioner a
new trial.
There is nothing new in the case itself, but in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Douglas we may see some idea of a trend, in opinions which may
be forthcoming. Quoting from Justice Douglas' dissent:
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, upheld the test oath re-
quirement upon which this prosecution is based, resting its decision
upon the ground that however obnoxious test oaths may be, they must
be endured in the interest of interstate commerce. Eleven years have
elapsed since that decision and I think it fair to say that this recent
experience with test oaths in this country has done nothing to change
the evil reputation they gained throughout previous centuries in other
countries. The question before us now is thus no different from that
originally presented to us in Douds: Can Congress, in the name of
regulation of interstate commerce, circumvent the history, language
and purpose of our Bill of Rights and impose test oaths designed to
penalize political or religious minorities? I would overrule the decision
in Douds and order this prosecution dismissed. Test oaths, whether
religious, political, or -both, are implacable foes of free thought. By
approving their imposition, this Court has injected compromise into a
field where the First Amendment forbids compromise.
23
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black concurred with Justice
Douglas in this dissent.
In December of 1961, the Supreme Court decided the case of Cramp
v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County.24 The Court heard
the case on an appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida. A Florida
statute required every employee of the State or its subdivisions to execute
a written oath in which he must swear that, inter alia, he has never
lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party."2 5 Under the law an employee's failure to subscribe to this oath
would result in his immediate discharge.
The appellant had been employed as a public school teacher in Orange
County for more than nine years when it was discovered that he had
never been required to execute this oath. He was requested to take
2 Id., p. 260.
2368 U.S. 278 (1961).
" Florida statute: Fla. Stat. § 876.05.
11
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the oath, and he refused to do so. He sued in a state circuit court for
a judgement declaring the oath requirement unconstitutional, and for
an injunction to prevent the Orange County Board of Public Instruc-
tion from requiring him to execute the oath and from discharging him
for failure to do so. He stated that he had not done any of the things
mentioned in the statute, as he understood it, but that its meaning was so
vague as to deprive him of liberty or property without due process of
law. The circuit court held the statute valid and denied the injunction.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the decision of the lower court;
the higher court held that the State could stipulate qualifications for public
employment and that such requirements did not infringe on the right
of a citizen to speak or assemble peaceably, but "merely provided that
when one speaks out to advocate the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States, or assembles for that purpose, he cannot
simultaneously work for and draw compensation from the government
he seeks to overthrow." 6 The state high court disposed of the claim that
the oath requirement was unconstitutionally vague by ruling that the
statute was perfectly clear and that anyone who could read English could
understand it, both as to its requirements and the effect of failure to
comply.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled first as to the appellants' standing to
attack the stated statute in that Court. The argument was made that
the self-exonerating sworn statements in the complaint showed that the
appellant could not possibly sustain injury by executing the oath, and
that he, therefore, lacked standing to question the constitutional validity
of the state law. The Court held that this argument had no application
to the appellant's claim that the statutory oath was unconstitutionally
vague. The Court next decided whether a State can constitutionally
compel those in its service to swear that they have never "knowingly lent
their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party,"
or whether forcing an employee either to take such an oath, at the risk
of subsequent prosecution for perjury, or face immediate dismissal from
public service is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Court noted that the oath here, said nothing of advocacy of
violent overthrow of the state or federal government, and it said nothing
of membership or affiliation with the Communist Party either in the
2" Note 24 supra, pp. 282-283.
12
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past or at the present. It held that the provisions of the statute were
written in extraordinarily ambiguous language and were completely lack-
ing in any terms susceptible of objective measurement. The Court stated
further that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law ... and it appears ... that these general
words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that a penalty prescribed
for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law."
1' 7
The Court held that "the vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further
aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates to inhibit the
exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively protected by the Constitu-
tion.""8 A statute which is so vague and indefinite that it permits the
punishment of the fair use of the opportunity for political discussion is
held by the Court to be repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case it was reaffirmed that constitu-
tional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursu-
ant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. The judgement
of the Supreme Court of Florida was reversed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the Court's
judgement and opinion, but also adhered to the view expressed in their
dissents in the Adler, Garner and Barenblatt cases, and to their concur-
rences in the Wieman case.
Nostrand v. Little came to the Court on appeal from the Supreme
Court of Washington; the case was remanded to resolve a question of
local law.2" After the remand, the State Supreme Court held that the
appellants, who were professors at the State University, were entitled to
hearings before they could be discharged for refusal to swear that they
are not members of the Communist Party or any other subversive organi-
zation, as required by a state statute. The case came back to the U.S.
Supreme Court on appeal in January of 1962; the appellants asked for
a judgement to declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, but the Court dismissed the appeal
for want of a substantial federal question.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black dissented from the dis-
" Id., p. 287.
28 Ibid.
2 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
13
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missal of this case. They stated that in their view the case did contain
questions on which the Court could decide.
The Washington oath required a teacher to swear that he was not a
"subversive person." The State law defined a subversive person as
"... any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the com-
mission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person
to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow,
destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration
of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of
the state of Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them by
revolution, force, or violence; or who with knowledge that the organiza-
tion is an organization as described in subsection (2) and (3) hereof,
becomes or remains a member of a subversive organization or a foreign
subversive organization." 3
Mr. Justice Douglas considered that one aspect of the question which
the Court did not answer here was very much akin to the one which they
answered in the Cramp case. In that case the Court held that "the oath
which required a teacher to say he had never knowingly lent his "aid" or
"support" or "advice" or "counsel" or 'influence" to the Communist
Party was unconstitutional, because it brought or might bring into its
net people who by parallelism of conduct, might be said to have given
"aid" to the Communist Party though the cause they espoused was
wholly lawful." 3'
Mr. Justice Douglas further stated that this oath presented the ques-
tion whether one who plans to alter the government by revolution or who
knowingly belongs to a group that holds that aim can be disqualified as
a teacher. He reminds that it could be argued that to alter the govern-
ment by a revolution which operates though the route of constitutional
amendments could be in keeping with our ideas of freedom of belief and
expression, and that until recently the idea of revolution has been a con-
cept that has been greatly revered in America.
The case of Baggett v. Bullitt came to the Supreme Court on an
appeal from a U.S. District Court in the State of Washington.2 The
action was brought by members of the faculty, staff, and students of
the University of Washington for a judgement declaring unconstitu-
"°See, RCW 9.81.010(2), (3), and (5); RCW 9.81.060; RCW 9.81.070; and
RCW 9.81.083.
8' Ibid.
3 377 U.s. 360 (1964).
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tional 1931 and 1955 statutes requiring the taking of oaths,' one for
Oath A for teaching personnel; oath B for other state employees.
"Oath Form A
"STATE OF WASHINGTON
"Statement and Oath for Teaching Faculty
of the University of Washington
"I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
constitution and laws of the United States of America and of the state of Washing-
ton, and will by precept and example promote respect for the flag and the institu-
tions of the United States of America and the state of Washington, reverence for
law and order, and undivided allegiance to the government of the United States;
"I further certify that I have read the provisions of RCW 9.81.010(2), (3), and
(5); RCW 9.81.060; RCW 9.81.070; and RCW 9.81.083, which are printed on the
reverse hereof; that I understand and am familiar with the contents thereof; that
I am not a subversive person as therein defined; and
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not a member of the Communist
party or knowingly of any other subversive organization.




"Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) to before me this ...................
day of ..................... 19.....
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, RE-
SIDIN G AT ............................................
"(To be executed in duplicate, one copy to be retained by individual.)
"NOTE: Those desiring to affirm may strike the words 'swear' and 'sworn to'
and substitute 'affirm' and 'affirmed,' respectively."
"Oath Form B
"STATE OF WASHINGTON
"Statement and Oath for Staff of the University of Washington
Other Than Teaching Faculty
"I certify that I have read the provisions of RCW 9.81.010(2), (3), and (5);
RCW 9.81.060; RCW 9.81.070; and RCW 9.81.083 which are printed on the
reverse hereof; that I understand and am familiar with the contents thereof; that
I am not a subversive person as therein defined; and
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not a member of the Communist
party or knowingly of any other subversive organization.
"I understand that this statement and oath are made subject to the penalties of
perjury.
(TITLE AND DEPARTMENT O OFFICE).......................
"Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) to before me this ....................
day of .................., 19.....
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, RE-
SIDING AT ...........................................
"(To be executed in duplicate, one copy to be retained by individual.)
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teachers and the other for all state employees, including teachers, as a
condition of employment. The 1931 oath requires teachers to swear, by
precept and example, to promote respect for the flag and the institutions
of the United States and the State of Washington, reverence for law
and order and undivided allegiance to the Government of the United
States. The 1955 oath for state employees, which incorporates provisions
of the state Subversive Activities Act, 4 requires an affidavit sworn to
the effect that the employee is not a "subversive person": that he does
not commit, or advise, teach, abet or advocate another to commit or aid
in the commission of any act intended to overthrow or alter, or assist
in the overthrow or alteration, of the constitutional form of government
by revolution, force or violence. The statute defines "subversive organiza-
tion" and "foreign subversive organization" in similar terms and the
Communist Party is declared a subversive organization.
The District Court held that the 1955 statute and oath were not unduly
vague and did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments; it
abstained from ruling on the 1931 oath because it had never been con-
sidered by the state courts. The Supreme Court reversed this decision;
it held as in Cramp that the 1955 statute and the 1931 act violated due
process since they, as well as the oaths based upon them, were unduly
vague, uncertain and broad. This case raised questions which also came
before the Court in Cramp. "Does the statute reach endorsement or
support for Communist candidates for office? Does it reach a lawyer
who represents the Communist Party or its members or a journalist who
defends constitutional rights of the Communist Party? The suscepti-
bility of the statutory language to require foreswearing of an undefined
variety of guiltless knowing behavior is what the Court condemned in
Cramp."3 5 The Washington statute suffers from additional difficulties
on vagueness grounds; here, a person is subversive not only if he him-
self commits the specified acts but if he abets or advises another in
aiding a third person to commit an act which will assist yet a fourth person
in the overthrow or alteration of constitutional government. The oath
goes far beyond overthrow or alteration by force or violence. It extends
to alteration which could include any rapid or fundamental change. It
might be construed to cover as subversive any organization or person
"NOTE: Those desiring to affirm may strike the words 'swear' and 'sworn to'
and substitute 'affirm' and 'affirmed," respectively."
54 Stat. 670, June 28, 1940, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1964).
Note 32 supra, p. 368.
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supporting, advocating or teaching peaceful but far-reaching constitutional
amendments such as repeal of the Twenty-second Amendment or the
participation by the United States in a world government. It would be
hazardous to risk the interpretation of such a sweeping statute to a
prosecutor's sense of fairness. The danger of prosecution for knowing
but guiltless behavior would remain too great.
The Court ruled that a State cannot require an employee to take an
unduly vague oath containing a promise of future conduct at the risk of
prosecution for perjury or loss of employment, particularly where the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms may thereby be deterred. It was
held that the interests of the students at the University in academic free-
dom are fully protected by a judgement in favor of the teaching personnel,
and there was therefore no occasion to pass on the standing of the students
to bring this suit.
Concerning the 1931 statute, the Court ruled that federal courts do not
automatically abstain when faced with a doubtful issue of state law, since
abstention involves a discretionary exercise of equity power.
The Court did not question the power of a state to take proper mea-
sures to safeguard public service from disloyal conduct, but stated that
"measures which purport to define disloyalty must allow public servants
to know what is and is not disloyal." 6
Under Arizona law state employees were required to take an oath1
7
to support the Federal and State Constitutions and state laws. The Legis-
lature put a gloss on the oath3 by subjecting to a prosecution for perjury
and for discharge from public office anyone who took the oath and who
"knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the com-
munist party of the United States or its successors or any of its sub-
ordinate organizations or any other organization having for one of its
purposes the overthrow of the government of Arizona or any of its
political subdivisions where the employee had knowledge of the unlawful
purpose." This law was challenged in the case of Elfbrandt v. Russell"9
which came to the Supreme Court on certiorari from the Supreme Court of
Arizona; the case was decided in April of 1966. Petitioner, a teacher and
a Quaker, decided she could not take the oath in good conscience because
she could not know what it meant, and she had no chance to get a hearing
" Note 32 supra, p. 380.
Arizona oath: see Arizona Revised Statute § 38-231 (1965 Supp.).
88 Legislative gloss: ibid., § E.
89381 U.S. 11 (1966).
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at which its precise scope and meaning could be determined. She sued for
declaratory relief; the Arizona Supreme Court sustained the oath; the
U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgement of the Arizona Court and
remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of Baggett v. Bullitt.
On reconsideration the Arizona Supreme Court reinstated its original
judgement, finding the oath "not afflicted" with the many uncertainties
found potentially punishable in Baggett. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and reversed the judgement of the Arizona Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that:
"Political groups may embrace both legal and illegal aims, and one may
join such groups without embracing their illegal aims, and those who
join an organization without sharing in its unlawful purposes pose no
threat to constitutional government, either as citizens or as public
employees. It held further that to presume conclusively that those
who join a "subversive" organization share its unlawful aims is for-
bidden by the principle that a State may not compel a citizen to prove
that he has not engaged in criminal advocacy. The Arizona Act is
not confined to those who join with "specific intent" to further the illegal
aims of the subversive organization; because it is not narrowly drawn
to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and
present danger, it unnecessarily infringes on the freedom of political
association protected by the First Amendment and made applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. First Amendment
freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions."
40
"Public employees of character and integrity may well forego their
calling rather than risk prosecution for perjury or compromise their com-
mitment to intellectual and political freedom. The communist trained in
fraud and perjury has no qualms in taking any oath; the loyal citizen,
conscious of history's oppressions, may well wonder whether the medieval
rack and torture wheel are next for the one who declines to take an in-
volved negative oath as evidence that he is a True Believer. "41
The case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents of The University of The
State of New York42 was decided by the Supreme Court in January
of 1967. Appellants were members of the faculty of the privately owned
and operated University of Buffalo, and became state employees when the
"Id., p. 17.
,1 Id., p. 18.
4385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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University was merged into the State University of New York in 1962.
As faculty members and employees of the State University their con-
tinued employment was conditioned upon their compliance with a New
York plan, formulated partly in statutes and partly in administrative regu-
lations,4" which the State utilized to prevent the appointment or retention
of "subversive" persons in state employment.
Appellants Hochfield, Maud, Keyishian and Garver were faculty
members; each refused to sign, as regulations then required, a certificate
that he was not a Communist, and that if he had ever been a Communist,
he had communicated that fact to the President of the State University of
New York. Each was notified that his failure to sign the certificate
would require his dismissal.
Appellant Starbuck was a non-faculty library employee and part-time
lecturer; personnel in that classification were not required to sign a
certificate but were required to answer in writing under oath the ques-
tion, "Have you ever advised or taught or were you ever a member of
any society or group of persons which taught or advocated the doctrine
that the Government of the United States or of any political subdivisions
thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any
unlawful means?" Starbuck was dismissed as a result of his refusal
to answer the question.
Appellants brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the state program violated the Federal Constitution in
various respects. A three-judge Federal District Court held that the
program was constitutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case
on appeal from that decision.
The Court considered some aspects of the constitutionality of the New
York plan fifteen years earlier in the Adler case in which it upheld some
provisions of the teacher loyalty program. The Adler decision came
before the extension of the program to state institutions of higher learn-
ing and was held as not controlling in the present case; also, the vagueness
issue presented in this case involving Section 3021 and Section 105 was
not decided in Adler, and the validity of the subversive organization
membership provision of Section 3022 was upheld at that time for reasons
which have subsequently been rejected by the Court.
Shortly before the trial of this case, the Feinberg certificate was
"New York Plan: Id., p. 610.
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rescinded. In lieu of the certificate, it was provided that each applicant
be informed that the statutes, Sections 3021 and 3022 of the Education
Law and Section 105 of the Civil Service Law, would constitute part
of his contract. The Court held that the change in procedure in no way
changed the Constitutional question.
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. It was held
that Section 3021 of the Education Law and Section 105, subdivisions
1(a), 1(b), and 3, of the Civil Service Law as implemented by the
machinery created pursuant to Section 3022 of the Education Law, are
unconstitutionally vague, since no teacher can know from Section 3021
of the Education Law and Section 105, subdivision 3, of the Civil Service
Law what constitutes the boundary between "seditious" and non-seditious
utterances and acts, and the other provisions may well prohibit the
employment of one who advocates doctrine abstractly without any
attempt to incite others to action, and may be construed to cover mere
expression of belief."
Subdivision 1(b) of Section 105 requires the disqualification of an
employee involved with the distribution of written material "containing
or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine" of forceful overthrow.
Mere advocacy of abstract doctrine here is apparently included. The
prohibition of distribution of matter "containing" the doctrine could be
used to bar histories of the evolution of Marxist doctrine or histories
tracing the background of the French, American, or Russian revolutions.
The intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its
proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism; the uncer-
tainty as to the acts proscribed increases that caution in those who believe
the written law means what it says. The result must be to stifle "that
free play of spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice."'4 5 That probability is enhanced by the provisions requiring an
annual review of every teacher to determine whether any utterance or act
of his, inside the classroom or out, came within the sanctions of the
laws.
46
The Court held further that our Nation is deeply committed to safe-
guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
', Note 42 supra, p. 599.
"Id., p. 601."Id., p. 602.
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special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.47
The rule here is that First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive, and government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity. New York's complicated and intricate scheme plainly violates
that standard.
The provisions of the Civil Service Law which made Communist
Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification for
employment in the public school system were held by the Court to be
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. Mere knowing membership
without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization
was held by the Court as a constitutionally inadequate basis for imposing
sanctions. Such a law infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms; it
rests on the doctrine of guilt by association; it seeks to bar employment
both for association which may be proscribed and for association which
may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment rights.
The judgement of the District Court was reversed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The case of Whitehill v. Elkins48 was heard by a three-judge Federal
District 'Court for the District of Maryland and dismissed; the Supreme
Court took the case on appeal and Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the
opinion of the Court in November of 1967.
The suit sought declaratory relief that a Maryland teacher's oath
required of the appellant was unconstitutional. Appellant was offered a
teaching position with the University of Maryland, but he refused to
take the required loyalty oath.49
The question considered by the Court here was whether the oath
was to be read in isolation or in connection with the Ober Act5" which
by Sections 1 and 13 defines a "subversive" as ". . . any person who com-
mits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets,
'" Id., p. 603.
,8389 U.S. 54 (1967).
Maryland oath:
"I ..................... , do hereby (Print Name-including middle initial)
certify that I am not engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow
the Government of the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any political
subdivision of either of them, by force or violence.
"I further certify that I understand the aforegoing statement is made subject
to the penalties of perjury prescribed in Article 27, Section 439 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland (1957 edition)."
"0 Art. 85A, Md. Ann. Code, 1957.
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advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit,
or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter,
or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional
form of the government of the United States, or of the State of Mary-
land, or any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force,
or violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization or a foreign
subversive organization, as more fully defined in this article." Section 1
defines the latter terms: "subversive organization" to mean a group that
would, inter alia, "alter" the form of government by revolution, force, or
violence; "foreign subversive organization" is defined as such a group
directed, dominated, or controlled by a foreign government which engages
in such activities.
The Court held that the oath must be read in the light of the Ober
Act. The prescribed oath requires, under threat of perjury, a statement
that the employee is not engaged 'in one way or another" in an attempt
to overthrow the Government by force or violence. The Court asks
whether a member of a group that was out to overthrow the Government
by force or violence would be engaged in that attempt "in one way or
another" within the meaning of the oath, even though he was ignorant
of the real aims of the group and wholly innocent of any illicit purpose?
The Court held that it could not tell; nor could a prospective employee
know, save as he risked a prosecution for perjury." The opinion stated
further that in the First Amendment field the continuing surveillance this
type of law places on teachers is hostile to academic freedom. Again the
Court found the lines between permissible and impermissible conduct
were quite indistinct; precision and clarity were not present; rather it
found an overbreadth that made possible oppressive or capricious applica-
tion as regimes changed.
This case, like others examined here, presents the classic example
of the need for narrowly drawn legislation in this sensitive and important
First Amendment area. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
District Court and held the Maryland teacher's oath to be unconstitutional.
By earlier vagueness tests the Maryland oath would have seemed ac-
ceptable. Thus, the Court's invalidation of this oath on grounds of vague-
ness indicates the extremely exacting specificity standard that the Court
is now disposed to require for disclaimer oaths. A rigorous vagueness
standard in this area is justifiable. To require an individual to swear that
51 Note 48 supra, p. 57.
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he will not commit certain acts, rather than simply to prohibit them by
statute, may greatly heighten his sensitivity to the watchful presence of
the state, and accordingly curtail his freedom of action; yet, the alacrity
with which the Court has struck down disclaimer oaths in recent decisions
suggests that vagueness may not be the principal reason for hostility
to this regulatory technique. The state's concern here is with a means
of identifying subversives. The disclaimer oath is really designed to
deter conduct and enforce an outward appearance of conformity, but
it does no more than a simple statutory disqualification to achieve that
goal. Therefore, the Court may find the disclaimer oath an unnecessarily
degrading type of regulation, especially as applied to members of the
academic profession.52
Thus, a properly drawn loyalty program, applicable only in areas
where the danger of subversion is significant, could legitimately rely on
conduct, overt acts and other direct evidence, as a means of identifying
persons likely to be unacceptable for employment in positions formerly
requiring loyalty oaths as a security measure.
African Public Law
In Colonial Africa, the term "African law" had a derogatory implica-
tion, as if the law of the Africans was not real law in the same way as
the English, or other European law. The colonial powers introduced their
own laws in every colonial territory as the general law in regulating the
colonies, and their governments. But the so-called English law in Africa,
was not the only law used in governing the colonial territories. There was
the African customary law which was more effective in native administra-
tion. The African customary law, although used by the British in further-
ing their colonial administration, was left undeveloped and publicly
ignored by the British for political reasons. Since the departure of the
British from Africa, all of this has changed.
In recent times, indigenous legal system in Africa has been the sub-
ject of collective study on a comparative basis, because it is now in the
power of African governments to modify or reject the colonial laws
deriving from antiquity.
In an effort to stimulate African pride and self-consciousness, it
" "Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom," 81 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
1069 (March, 1968).
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